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Abstract—Signals from sensors placed at different locations are
used for control and protection purposes in a nuclear reactor. It
also requires in-service Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) for its
safe operation. The sensor signals are generally a superimposition
of low-frequency components representative of true values of the
variables being monitored; occasional high-frequency periodical
oscillations due to disturbances and faults; and sensor faults.
Techniques like Principal Component Analysis (PCA) can be
used for FDI, however, it would be more meaningful if the FDI
technique can also help for predictive maintenance of reactor
internals through vibration spectra. To address these issues, a
multi-scale PCA, integrating wavelet transform with PCA and
aiming to reduce the modeling cost by using only a fewer scales
that contribute to the monitoring has been proposed in this paper
for online FDI of Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR).
A new mathematical formulation of the Generalized Likelihood
Ratio Test for its use with wavelet approximation coefficients has
also been proposed for better sensor-FDI outcomes. The proposed
approach detects and isolates sensor faults and process faults
using the signals from neutron detectors. Efficacy of the proposed
technique is established on the simulated ex-core ion chamber
data of AHWR considering different scenarios that involve
localized frequency contents representative of process faults,
slowly developing (incipient) sensor faults, and the simultaneous
presence of two or more of these scenarios. Simulation results
validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme for online FDI
in the reactor.
Index Terms—Fault Detection and Isolation, Ex-core neutron
detectors, Ion chambers, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, Prin-
cipal Component Analysis, Wavelets.
I. INTRODUCTION
NUCLEAR reactors being safety critical systems needmultiple sensors for measurement of key parameters such
as flow, pressure, temperature, and neutron flux. The sensor
signals generally consist of both static and dynamic compo-
nents representing slow as well as fast varying phenomena
in the reactors. The static component corresponds to process
variables measured by the sensors, whereas the dynamic com-
ponent results from inherent fluctuations in process variables
as a result of external disturbances on the plant such as random
neutron flux, random heat transfer, turbulence, vibration, and
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other effects [1]. For instance, neutron detectors carry the
signal corresponding not only to the neutron flux which is
a slowly varying signal but also to the vibration of reactor
internals. The hardware redundancy among sensors, which is
always maintained for continuous safe-operation of the reactor
even when some sensors malfunction, plays a vital role in
Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI). Analytical redundancy or
mathematical relationships among sensor signals can be found
through either first principles approach or using statistical
techniques like Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [2],
[3]. PCA-based FDI, though proved to be highly efficient
for sensor fault detection as presented in [3], acts only on
the static components of the detector signals to find the
possible degradation. However, extending PCA-based FDI to
the process condition monitoring and diagnostics in addition
to the sensor anomalies will be of more interest.
Generally, the neutron detector signals also contain mea-
surement noises that may arise from different sources like
stochastic nature of neutron interaction, fluctuation in pressure
and temperature, mechanical vibration of internal parts, and
so on. Neutron noise analysis can be used as a predictive
maintenance strategy to safeguard the structural integrity,
which would be otherwise at a risk due to vibration induced
accidents. The neutron noises obtained from in-core or ex-
core detectors, in the typical range of 0.5 Hz to 25 Hz,
give important information for in-service monitoring of the
core for excessive mechanical motion of fuel assemblies, in-
core detector tubes, the reactor core support barrel, reactor
vessel, and reactor coolant pumps [1], [4]–[8]. In literature,
various works on the analysis of neutron detector noises using
frequency domain techniques namely, fast Fourier transform,
auto power spectral density, and cross power spectral density
have been reported for different reactor configurations [4]–
[10]. Though these frequency domain techniques were proved
to be successful in detecting vibration-induced faults visible
in the frequency spectrum, they ignore the cross-correlations
among the static component of the sensor signals as they
need to be applied individually on each signal. This limits
their application, as the information hidden in cross-correlation
is left unused, which plays a vital role in the detection of
sensor faults. With the objective of detecting sensor faults,
PCA which captures cross-correlations among the variables
has been widely used in nuclear engineering [3], [11]–[13].
In most of the reported works, PCA models are developed for
the underlying process assuming its existence only at a single
scale in measurement space. However, it is well known that
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in systems like large nuclear reactors, multiple modes interact
simultaneously and many time-frequency localized phenomena
evolve at different scales of time [14]. These events may not be
clearly visible at a single scale in measurement space. Thus, it
is imperative to have data representation at appropriate scales
or resolutions. Wavelets provide an architecture for multi-
scale data visualization due to their inherent multi-resolution
approximation property and simultaneous time-frequency lo-
calization capability. They decompose noisy signals at dif-
ferent resolutions, thereby they extract features relevant to
process dynamics and efficiently remove noise contribution.
Processing based on wavelets minimizes distortion of signal
bandwidth and thus improves the signal-to-noise ratio as com-
pared to the frequency domain-based techniques which reduce
only the high-frequency components of a signal and require
that signal and noise spectra must be separable. Recently, the
advantages of wavelets in processing neutron detector data,
power transients, and in fault diagnosis have been reported
[15]–[18].
In the last two decades, wavelet-based multi-scale tech-
niques have demonstrated superior performance over the con-
ventional single-scale approaches in different applications such
as modeling, prediction, data-compression, and rectification.
For process monitoring, Bakshi [19] proposed a Multi-Scale
Principal Component Analysis (MSPCA) formulation where
signals are decomposed at different scales using wavelet trans-
form and then PCA is applied at individual scales to monitor
the frequency induced signatures. This technique is very much
suitable for industrial processes where non-stationary multi-
scale events are inherently existing. The approach simultane-
ously extracts auto-correlation within a sensor using wavelets
and cross-correlation across the sensors through PCA. In [20]
and [21], applications of MSPCA in FDI are demonstrated
and it is shown that MSPCA outperforms the classical PCA
technique. In most of the works, all the scales were utilized
for building a PCA model. However, in practice, not all
the scales contribute to process monitoring and control. For
instance, usually the finest scale detail contains contribution
arising mainly from high-frequency noise components. Hence,
a significant reduction in the modeling effort can be achieved
by selectively removing the detail scales not contributing
much. For this, the occurrence of significant scales is to be
found. In this work, the classical MSPCA method has been
modified by identifying and building parsimonious models
only at those scales where the underlying process evolves
predominantly.
Therefore, the proposed work develops a novel online
MSPCA-based FDI for process condition monitoring and diag-
nostics. Specifically, the technique is applied to the Advanced
Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) [22] in which coolant flow-
induced vibrations of fuel may be caused [23]. This could
be seen as a process fault that results in the variation of the
frequency spectrum. Neutron noise signatures obtained from
the ex-core ion chamber signals of AHWR are analyzed and
statistics like Squared Prediction Error (SPE) are computed at
significant scales to observe the on-set of vibration-induced
faults. In addition, sensor faults or degradation can be iden-
tified from the measurements violating the algebraic relation-
ships dictated by the constraint models obtained through PCA,
when applied on either the measurement data or on the data
selectively reconstructed after inverse-wavelet transformation
or on the low-frequency approximation coefficients obtained
through wavelets. FDI tools like Generalized Likelihood Ratio
Test (GLRT) [24] integrated with MSPCA as used in [25],
[26] for the detection of the process faults can also be used for
dealing with the sensor faults. For this, fault signature matrices
need to be constructed from the constraint residuals to identify
the faulty sensor and the fault magnitude. However, none of
the works in the literature used such an MSPCA-based GLRT
formulation. In this paper, such formulation is used for sensor-
FDI based on the original measurement data and the data
reconstructed with parsimonious MSPCA models discussed
before. Further, a new mathematical formulation of GLRT is
also proposed so that it can process the wavelet approximation
coefficients for better sensor-FDI outcomes such as quick
detection, accuracy in fault location and that in the estimate of
the fault magnitude. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme
is established for the case of an incipient fault in one of the
ion chambers of AHWR.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II briefly discusses wavelets, PCA, and GLRT. Section III
formulates the MSPCA scheme for FDI. Section IV demon-
strates the application of the proposed technique to AHWR
through the ex-core ion chambers. Section V presents the
results of analysis when MSPCA is applied on the simulated
ion chamber signals of AHWR. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Section VI. The fault signature matrices and the other
formulations for GLRT based on approximation coefficients;
and PCA models obtained from the original, reconstructed and
the approximations data are respectively given in Appendix A
and Appendix B.
II. WAVELETS, PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS, AND
GENERALIZED LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST
A. Wavelet Transform
Wavelets are the atoms with variable time-frequency res-
olution for localization of the events. They are appropriate
for analyzing phenomena having short-lived high-frequency
components and long-lived low-frequency components or in
which the former are superimposed on the latter [27], [28]. The
Continuous Wavelet Transform (CWT) of a square integrable
function y(t) can be expressed as the correlation between y(t)
and the dilated and translated version of wavelet function. It
is given by the inner product of y(t) and the wavelet function
as
W (s, τ) =
〈
y(t), 1√
s
ψ
(
t−τ
s
)〉
= 1√
s
∞∫
−∞
y(t)ψ∗
(
t−τ
s
)
dt
(1)
where ∗ represents the complex conjugate. The wavelet func-
tion ψ integrates to zero and has finite energy [28]. The CWT
operation maps a one dimensional function y(t) to a function
of two variables s ∈ R+ and τ ∈ R which respectively
represent wavelet dilation and translation parameters. The
CWT coefficients W (s, τ) give a redundant wavelet repre-
sentation. However, a computationally efficient non-redundant
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representation can be obtained by sampling s and τ on a
dyadic grid known as the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT).
The DWT coefficients are determined by selecting s = 2j
and τ = 2j l, where j and l are scale and position indices
respectively with j, l ∈ Z, as given by
W (2j , 2j l) =
1√
2j
+∞∫
−∞
y(t)ψ∗
(
t− 2j l
2j
)
dt (2)
Therefore, using (2), function y(t) can be represented as
y(t) =
+∞∑
j=−∞
+∞∑
l=−∞
a(j, l)2−j/2ψ(2−jt− l)
=
+∞∑
j=−∞
+∞∑
l=−∞
a(j, l)ψj,l(t),
(3)
where the two-dimensional sequence a(j, l) constitutes
wavelet coefficients. Equation (3) indicates the multi-
resolution ability of the wavelet functions. It constructs a
hierarchy of approximations in various nested subspaces. The
sub-spaces are defined by scaling function, φ(t) and wavelet
function, ψ(t), which carry the signal decomposition in ap-
proximation and detail sub-spaces respectively. Thus, from (3),
y(t) =
∞∑
l=−∞
cJ+1,lφJ+1,l(t) +
J∑
j=0
∞∑
l=−∞
dj,lψj,l(t), (4)
where the coefficients cJ+1,l and dj,l are called as approxi-
mation and detail coefficients respectively. Scale J represent
the maximum depth of decomposition while J + 1 represents
approximation at J th scale.
B. Principal Component Analysis
The real-time data as collected on the ion chamber signals
of a reactor have the stochastic properties along with the
deterministic nature as given by the n−variate noisy data
vector y = x + ε, which is the sum of the true data vector
x ∈ Rn and the white noise vector ε ∈ Rn. Assuming that m
number of variables (m < n) in x are dependent on other
variables, there are (n − m) significant eigenvalues whose
corresponding eigenvectors span the principal component sub-
space and there are m number of insignificant but non-zero
eigenvalues that span the residual subspace. PCA projects
the n × N dimensional data matrix Y = [y1 y2 . . .yN ]
onto the subspaces with major and minor variabilities, where
yk ∈ Rn,∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N represents the data vector at
an instant k. To state it otherwise, the eigenvector matrix
V = [P B], where P = [v1 v2 . . .vn−m] represents the prin-
cipal component subspace and B = [vn−m+1 vn−m+2 . . .vn]
represents the residual subspace and converts the correlated
variables in x into uncorrelated scores given by
ti = v
T
i Y , ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (5)
for each of the eigenvectors vi and thus separates Y into de-
terministic variation (due to change in process) and stochastic
variation (due to noise). However, such projection requires the
order of the residual subspace m, called the model order. Once
it is known, we can decompose the sample data vector at an
instant k into the signal matrix xˆk and the noise matrix eˆk
with the help of matrices P and B as follows:
yk = PP
Tyk +BB
Tyk = xˆk + eˆk. (6)
The vector xˆk = PP Tyk gives the data vector reconstructed
using the n −m number of principal components in P and
eˆk = BB
Tyk gives the error in this reconstruction. The
constraint residuals vector at time k is given by
rk = B
Tyk,∈ Rm (7)
and it has a mean value of 0, i.e., E[rk] ' 0,∀ i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Since the operation BTyk = rk ' 0 resembles the relation
Ax = 0 on an average sense, BT is taken equivalent to the
constraint model A that shows the relationships among the
variables in the measurement vector y [3].
At any instant k, SPE or Q statistics [13], [20] to take
decisions about the sensor faults can be computed as
Qk = y
T
k (I − PP T )yk. (8)
For a false alarm probability α, the threshold value of Q
statistic can be computed as [25]
Qα = gχ
2
α,h, (9)
where g =
variance(Q)
2×mean(Q) and χ
2
α,h is the value of chi-square
distribution at a significance level of α with degrees of freedom
given by h =
2×mean(Q)2
variance(Q)
. In online FDI, if the SPE
statistic Qk computed from (8) exceeds the threshold Qα, a
fault is declared and the source and magnitude of fault can be
investigated through the techniques such as GLRT.
C. Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test
In GLRT, the fault signature vectors f j = Aej are
developed for each measurement j, where ej is the unit vector
with 1 at position j. The fault signature matrix that holds fault
signature vectors as its columns can be expressed as [24]
F i =

Aei1 , i1 = 1, ..., n;
A(ei1 , ei2), ∀i1, i2 = 1, ..., n, i1 6= i2; ...;
A(ei1 , ei2 , ..., eig ), ∀i1, i2, ..., ig = 1, ..., n,
i1 6= i2 6= ... 6= ig,
(10)
where the subscript i refers to the set of combinations in which
i1, i2, ..., ig are chosen to exhaustively consider all possible
combinations of number of simultaneous sensor-faults from
1, 2, ..., g. The residuals have a mean of 0 and F ibk in the
presence of no and g faults hypothesized respectively, where
bk is a column vector of unknown magnitudes of faults at the
instant k.
If p(.) denotes the probability density function, then the
Generalized Likelihood Ratio of the m-variate residuals ob-
tained from (7) can be written as
λ(r) = sup
p(r|H1)
p(r|H0) , (11)
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where H1 and H0 respectively represent the hypotheses of
fault and no-fault. Using the normal probability density func-
tion for the residuals r, (11) can be written as
λ(r) = sup
i,bk
exp
{
− 12%Ti,kΣ−1r %i,k
}
exp
{− 12rTkΣ−1r rk} , (12)
where %i,k = rk−F ibk. Defining L = 2 lnλ(r) = supi Li,k,
where
Li,k = r
T
kΣ
−1
r rk − sup
bk
%Ti,kΣ
−1
r %i,k, (13)
the maximum likelihood estimates of the fault magnitudes bˆk
is obtained by equating the first derivative of (13) with respect
to bk to zero, and is
bˆk = (F
T
i Σ
−1
r F i)
−1(F Ti Σ
−1
r rk), (14)
and the corresponding test statistics are
Li,k = (F
T
i Σ
−1
r rk)
T (F Ti Σ
−1
r F i)
−1(F Ti Σ
−1
r rk). (15)
The false alarm probabilities for each of the test statistics
Li,k is
αi,k = p(χ
2
g,α ≥ Li,k), (16)
where χ2g,α is a random variable following a chi-square
distribution with g degrees of freedom. The combination
i chosen out of {i1 = 1, ..., n; i1, i2 = 1, ..., n, i1 6=
i2; ...; i1, i2, ..., ig = 1, ..., n, i1 6= i2 6= ... 6= ig} and
corresponding to minimum false alarm probability gives the
number and locations of faults and the bias magnitudes.
For the evaluation of GLRT, the following indices can be
computed with the help of the hypothesis testing in which
the null hypothesis H0 states that no fault is present; and the
alternative hypothesis H1 states that faults are present in one
or more signals [3]:
1) Overall Detection Rate (ODR): It is the percentage of
detection of one or more faults or rejection of H0 out of
total number of trials. It involves detection, even during
the cases where H0 is true. For a true H1, ODR is
desirable to be close to 100% [3].
2) Overall Power (OP): It is the percentage of trials when
one or more faults are correctly identified for a true H1.
For a true H1, OP should be close to 100% [3].
3) Mean-Square Error (MSE): It is a measure of error in the
estimate of fault magnitude in a sensor, defined as√∑
k∈C(bk − bˆk)T (bk − bˆk)
NC
,
where C is the set of instants at which the faults are
correctly identified and NC is the cardinality of C [29].
III. MULTI-SCALE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS
FOR ON-LINE FDI
MSPCA for FDI involves different sequential operations
on the multi-variate data, namely decomposition of the data
into multiple scales using wavelets, the projection of this
decomposed data onto the principal components, and inverse
wavelet decomposition for reconstructing the data. Q statistics
are computed from the appropriate variables from (9), which
will be used for MSPCA-based FDI whose objectives are
the detection of vibration signatures of process internals and
sensor faults. These objectives are met by a one-time executed
off-line algorithm for model development and a continuously
running online algorithm for every new observation [21]. The
concepts involved in the MSPCA-based FDI are discussed in
this section.
A. Multi-scale Data Decomposition
For a given time-series y¯ ∈ R2J×1, the DWT operation in
terms of matrix multiplication is given by
yw =
[
yTJ+1 y
T
J y
T
J−1 · · · yT1
]T
= Wy¯, (17)
where yw is called as wavelet coefficient and comprised
of approximation (at scale J + 1) and details (at scales
j = 1, 2, . . . , J). The wavelet operator W is given by
W =
[
J
Π
j=1
HTj G
T
J
J−1
Π
j=1
HTj G
T
J−1
J−2
Π
j=1
HTj ··· GT1
]T
,
=
[
H˜
T
J G˜
T
J G˜
T
J−1 ··· G˜
T
1
]T
, (18)
where H˜J
(
1× 2J) and G˜J (2J−j × 2J) are matrices of
wavelet filter coefficients.
The effective implementation of wavelet-based techniques
requires careful selection of wavelet and the maximum depth
of decomposition. Generally, complex wavelets can be used
for capturing oscillatory behaviour whereas real ones can be
used for detecting peaks. For instance, real wavelets such as
Haar are suitable for representing highly localized events like
singularities or sudden changes due to their piecewise constant
representation. They compute the transformation entirely using
the past and present data; avoid undesirable border distortions
due to signal extensions; and do not introduce any delay in the
analysis [30]. Hence, Haar wavelets are chosen in the proposed
scheme. The maximum depth or scale of decomposition J
is selected so as to ensure that a minimum number of ob-
servations hit the support of basis function. It can be found
out using the Fourier transform such that the magnitude of
the Fourier transform is above the noise floor-level [14], i.e.,∣∣y (pi/2J)∣∣ ≥ |y (pi/f)|. It has been observed that not all the
scales contribute in determining process behavior, thus for a
parsimonious model representation, the selection of significant
scales is a crucial step [14], [30].
The online implementation of wavelet transform for J = 2
is shown in Fig 1. The signal is measured at finest scale j = 0
and assumed to be available up to the current time instant k.
A window of 2J observations is formed and decomposed into
detail spaces at j = 1, 2, . . . , J and an approximation space at
j = J+1. With the availability of new data at every subsequent
instant, the window is translated by one time step and the
wavelet decomposition is performed. It may be noted that due
to redundancy in representation, only the last (or rightmost)
coefficients indexed as k, k + 1, . . . at each scale are stored.
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Fig. 1. Implementation of wavelet transform for J = 2.
B. Local PCA Models at Different Scales
Once a decomposition depth J is worked out, PCA is
applied to each of the J + 1 matrices (J matrices holding
details and 1 matrix holding approximation coefficients) with
an objective of extracting cross-correlation of the sensors.
However, the challenge lies in choosing the model order
mj , j = 1, 2, . . . , J + 1 at each scale accurately. There
are many methods for determining model order [2], out of
which the method based on Cumulative Percentage of Variance
(CPV) of principal components is used here. According to this
method, the minimum number of principal components, the
cumulative sum of whose eigenvalues exceeds 95% of the sum
of all eigenvalues is taken as pj , the order of principal compo-
nent subspace. Thus, the model order is obtained as the order
of the subspace of insignificant variations as mj = n− pj . It
should be noted that the data at each scale may have different
values for mj that decides the dimensions of the matrices P j
and Bj of that scale.
If the frequency spectrum of the process is changed with
an addition of one or more frequency components as a result
of faults, the Qj statistics at the scales corresponding to
added frequencies show large values due to broken covariance
structure of the details-data while their values for rest of the
frequency spectrum, remain by and large unaffected. Hence,
these statistics can be continuously monitored for the detection
and identification of process faults.
Moreover, sensor faults can be detected with the help
of Q statistics computed from the approximations obtained
in the wavelet transformation. As mentioned before, a new
mathematical formulation has been suggested to use GLRT
on the wavelet approximation coefficients.
Lemma III.1. When the GLRT is applied on the wavelet ap-
proximation coefficients, the fault signature matrix in various
hypothesized-number of sensor faults up to g is
F i =

AAEi1H˜
T
J , i1 = 1, ..., n;
AA(Ei1H˜
T
J ,Ei2H˜
T
J ), ∀i1, i2 = 1, ..., n, i1 6= i2; ...;
AA(Ei1H˜
T
J ,Ei2H˜
T
J , ...,EigH˜
T
J ),
∀i1, i2, ..., ig = 1, ..., n, i1 6= i2 6= ... 6= ig,
where AA is the PCA-based constraint model obtained from
approximation coefficients and Ei ∈ Rn×2J is a matrix whose
ith row has its all elements equal to 1.
Proof. Refer to Appendix A. 
C. Data Pre-processing and Synthesis
Wavelet thresholding followed by signal reconstruction is
a well-established denoised technique that enables nonlinear
approximation of a signal [27]. Wavelet transform distributes
contribution of noise among all small coefficients while con-
tribution from signal remains in a small number of high am-
plitude coefficients. Thus, it decorrelates wavelet coefficients
of the signal from that of the noise thereby preserving only
relevant signal components. Thresholding operation can either
be hard thresholding or soft thresholding. In case of hard
thresholding, the coefficients below a certain threshold are
made equal to zero, while in soft thresholding the coefficients
are reduced by the given threshold. Wavelet pre-processing can
also be performed by removing the entire contribution arising
from insignificant details. The signal is then reconstructed only
from the information present at significant scales.
The inverse wavelet transform to obtain the reconstructed
signal in measurement domain is given by
yˆ = Wyw, (19)
where W represent the inverse wavelet operator. yw and yˆ
contain pre-processed wavelet coefficients and reconstructed
processed signal respectively.
D. Off-line MSPCA algorithm
The detailed sequence of operations to be performed for
developing the process-history-based models are given in the
following off-line algorithm:
1) Obtain the n-variate observations in sufficiently large num-
ber N during a fault-free operation. Compute the level J
of wavelet decomposition as described in Sec. III-A and
form the wavelet decomposition matrix W .
2) Decompose each of the n variables in the data matrix
Y into J vectors of detail coefficients and 1 vector of
approximation coefficients using W .
3) Group the detail coefficients at each level of all variables
as a matrix and approximation coefficients as another
matrix, i.e., J number of detail matrices and 1 number
of approximation matrix.
4) Apply SVD on the data in each of J+1 matrices obtained
in Step-3. For each of the J+1 data sets, choose the value
of mj as explained in Sec. III-B and develop PCA models
(P j and Bj matrices) from the eigenvectors of the data.
5) Compute Qj statistics using the PCA models at each scale
and determine the thresholds Qα,j .
6) Perform data pre-processing and then apply inverse wavelet
transformation on the processed data of each variable using
W .
This completes the development of process-history-based
models which can now be used on the new observations.
E. On-line MSPCA algorithm
Once the off-line algorithm is executed, another algorithm
has to be run which is similar to the off-line one but excludes
5
the need for the repeated development of PCA models and
wavelet transformation matrix W . The data used at the instant
k, denoted by Y k ∈ Rn×2J comprise of all the 2J instants
prior to and including k. The steps involved are as follows:
1) Set observation index k = 1. Load the data Y k, all the
PCA models (P j and Bj matrices) developed for details
and approximations; and wavelet transformation matrix W .
2) Decompose Y k into detail and approximation coefficients
using the matrix W .
3) Use PCA models on these coefficients to get Qj statistics
∀j = 1, 2, ..., J + 1 .
4) For all details with scale index j = 1, 2, ..., J , declare a
process fault, if the Qj statistics exceed the corresponding
thresholds Qα,j , and investigate the type of fault from the
wavelet coefficients.
5) From the approximations, declare a sensor fault if QJ+1
statistic exceeds the thresholds Qα,J+1, apply GLRT and
output the FDI outcomes.
6) Selectively reconstruct the measurement data using inverse
wavelet transformation matrix W for their further use.
7) Increment k by 1, input new data Y k and go to step-2.
The flow-chart representation of this online algorithm is given
in Fig. 2.
Start
Set observation index k = 1 and
load the matrices P , B, W and Y k
Decompose the data Y k into detail and ap-
proximation coefficients using the matrix W
Obtain Q statistics from these coefficients
using corresponding PCA models
Is Qj > Qα,j
at any level
j = 1, ..., J?
Outcomes
of process
FDI
Is
QJ+1 > Qα,J+1?
Reconstruct the measurement data using
inverse wavelet transformation matrix W
Run GLRT
Outcomes
of sensor
FDI
Increment k by 1 and load new Y k
YesNo
Yes
No
Fig. 2. Flow chart of MSPCA-based online FDI scheme
IV. APPLICATION OF MSPCA-BASED FDI TO ION
CHAMBERS OF AHWR
The MSPCA-based FDI scheme is applied to the ion
chamber signals of AHWR, a 920 MW (thermal), vertical,
pressure tube type, heavy-water moderated, boiling light-water
cooled, natural circulation type reactor [22]. AHWR has 9 ex-
core ion chambers located in the vault water surrounding the
reflector [3], [31]. The ion chambers sense the leakage flux
entering into the vault water, which in turn is proportional to
the core-average neutron flux. Out of the 9 ion chambers, 3 ion
chambers (namely ion chamber-1, 2, 3) are meant for reactor
control and monitoring, 3 ion chambers (namely ion chamber-
4, 5, 6) are for primary shut-down system denoted as Shut-
Down System-1, and remaining 3 (namely ion chamber-7, 8,
9) are for secondary shut-down system denoted as Shut-Down
System-2.
Like any other large reactor, AHWR is also prone to vibra-
tions of internal parts. For instance, a high-velocity coolant
flow can excite fuel bundle and fuel elements inside it thereby
resulting in vibrations of the fuel bundle. In AHWR, the
vibration spectrum, in this case, is found out to have two
cluster modes around 5 and 11 Hz [23]. These low-frequency
vibrations may cause inter-element rubbing that can eventually
damage the fuel bundle. There are other possible ways also
that lead to vibration-induced damages. In all the significant
scenarios leading to vibrations, the frequencies of vibrations
are less than 30 Hz [1], [4]–[10]. As these are low frequencies,
their resolution with accelerometers, which are suitable for
high frequencies, is a complex phenomenon. However, the
resolution is quite easy with ion chamber signals as they are
sensitive to neutron flux distribution, which is affected due to
the vibrations of the internal parts of the reactor. For example,
thermo-hydraulic fluctuations generate oscillatory behaviour
in the ion chamber signals at around 1 Hz, whereas the real
value of the core average flux continues to exhibit its normal
behaviour. The second mode of oscillation is also generally
present in some of the process-faults like the vibration of the
deck plate as in the case of fuel assembly vibrations.
Taking different aspects into consideration, the current from
the linear amplifier of an ion chamber-l can be represented as
il = Kφl + εl + µ+ bl + 4 mA, l = 1, 2, · · · , 9, (20)
where K = 10.667 is the product of detector sensitivity and
the gain of the amplifier stages and φl denotes the per-unit
(p.u.) value of the local neutron flux at the lth ion chamber
location, which is directly proportional to the core average
flux for nominal flux distribution. εl is the measurement noise
component in the uncertainty vector ε as discussed in Section
II-B. The noise ε is generally independent and normally
distributed with the following properties [32]:
E[ε] = 0, E[εkε
T
l ] = Rδk,l,
where R is the covariance matrix of the measurement un-
certainties, and δk,l is the Kronecker delta. The parameter µ
in (20) denotes sinusoidal functions representative of process
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faults, if any, that induce vibrations as given in
µ =
h∑
k=1
Mksin (2pifkt) , (21)
where Mk and fk are the magnitude and frequency of the kth
frequency component respectively. Lastly, bl is the degradation
in the lth ion chamber signal due to a sensor fault, if any.
The frequency dependent noise signatures in the ion cham-
ber currents, approximated by (20), are measured regularly
for process-fault detection [1], [4]–[8]. After the detection
of process faults, the sources of noise components can be
identified by comparing the measured noise signatures with
baseline signatures of each anticipated fault. MSPCA-based
scheme for FDI can then be designed so as to capture one or
more of the noise signatures at different scales. The Q statistics
computed at these scales play a major role in discriminating
between different faults. It may also be noted that though bl
may represent either an incipient fault or an abrupt fault in
the sensor, its time-dependent magnitude is immaterial for
the analysis like PCA-based FDI that are concerned only
about cross-correlation in the ion chamber signals but not
the auto-correlation. The Q statistics can be computed on the
reconstructed measurement data for fault detection, which is
followed by fault identification with GLRT.
Fig. 3 depicts the implementation of the proposed MSPCA-
based scheme for FDI in AHWR. Each of the control and
protection systems is fed with signals from linear amplifiers of
the ion chambers. Although signals are tapped from the 9 ion
chambers before being fed to the MSPCA-based FDI system,
physical separation and electrical isolation among control and
each of the protection systems are maintained. The time series
data of all 9 ion chambers in steady-state and in transient
situations simulated using a mathematical model of the AHWR
core and the ion chamber model given by (20), as described in
[31], is supplied to the online MSPCA-based scheme for FDI
as shown in Fig. 3. The wavelet transform block decomposes
the data from each ion chamber into approximation and details
based on the decomposition depth J . PCA is applied on the
approximation and details at each level of all the 9 ion chamber
data. The violations of Q statistics at each level j = 1, 2, ..., J
are checked against the corresponding thresholds to detect the
process faults, if any. On the other hand, the violations of Q
statistics at level J + 1 are checked against the threshold to
detect the sensor faults, if any. If sensor faults are detected,
GLRT is applied to know the faulty sensor index and the
fault estimate. After the FDI is performed, the inverse wavelet
transformation is applied to the pre-processed data to get the
data in measurement space for their further use by control and
protection systems.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, a detailed analysis is performed on the
results obtained through MSPCA approach on the ion chamber
data simulated through the mathematical model of AHWR.
A demand power change transient is considered, wherein the
demand power change from 1.0 p.u. to 0.9 p.u. is reflected in
all the 9 ion chamber signals. The data of ion chamber signals
is simulated for 140 s out of which the reactor is at steady-state
producing 1.0 p.u. till 100 s at which it undergoes the demand
power change transient. A sampling time of 0.02 s leads
to the generation of 7000 observations on 9 ion chambers.
The measurement noise in (20) is assumed to be normally
distributed with a standard deviation of 0.29 mA, which is
equivalent to 2% random fluctuations around the full power
steady-state.
Simulations are performed in such a way that one simulation
is sufficient to cover different scenarios. The scenarios consid-
ered involve the data carrying no fault, one or two frequencies
indicative of process faults, one frequency along with a sensor
fault, two frequencies along with a sensor fault, a sensor fault
alone, process change and sensor fault together, one or two
frequency components with simultaneous presence of both
process change and sensor fault. To include all these scenarios
in a single simulation, the data of 7000 observations length is
divided into different windows numbered from I to XIII as
shown in Fig. 4. The scenarios in each of these windows are
as follows:
1) Window-I: The data in this window are used for the
computation of J , W , P , and B.
2) Window-II: The data in this window are considered to be
fault-free, i.e., there are no process-fault induced frequen-
cies, no sensor fault, and there is no process change as
well. This case is considered to test the algorithm against
the no-fault case.
3) Window-III: In this window, the data carry components of
a single frequency, say f1.
4) Window-IV: In this window, the data carry components of
a single frequency, say f2 6= f1.
5) Window-V: This data window is corrupted by two different
frequency components f1 and f2.
6) Window-VI: In this window, one of the sensors, namely ion
chamber-5, is assumed to start developing an incipient fault
along with the presence of fault-induced frequency f1. The
rate of rise of this incipient nature is assumed to be constant
at 0.2% of the nominal value of the signal at steady-state
(14.67 A) per second such that the fault shows the nature
of a ramp signal. It is also assumed that the rate of rise
of fault magnitude persists in other subsequent windows as
well such that the fault grows by a value of 2.934 A for
every 100 s. The growth of this sensor-fault magnitude is
as shown in Fig. 5.
7) Window-VII: In this window, ion chamber-5 is assumed
to be faulty as described in point-6 above, along with the
presence of fault-induced frequency f2.
8) Window-VIII: This data window has both fault-induced
frequencies f1 and f2 along with a sensor fault in ion
chamber-5.
9) Window-IX: In this window, only the incipient fault in the
ion chamber-5 is considered.
10) Window-X: This window constitutes both the sensor fault
in ion chamber-5 along with the commencement of process
change from 1.0 p.u. and its way towards 0.9 p.u.
11) Window-XI: This data window holds the frequency f1,
sensor fault in ion chamber-5 and the process change that
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Fig. 3. Implementation of the proposed MSPCA-based method for FDI in AHWR.
commenced in Window-X.
12) Window-XII: This data window holds the frequency f2,
sensor fault and the process change that commenced in
Window-X.
13) Window-XIII: This data window holds the fault-induced
frequencies f1 and f2, sensor fault, and the process change
that commenced in Window-X.
Signals of all the 9 ion chambers are shown in Fig. 6, in
which the signals can be seen to have been contaminated by
the faults as per the nature of data windows described above.
A. Model development
The decomposition depth, J , to be used for wavelet decom-
position can be computed as explained in Sec.III-A from the
data of one of the ion chamber signals. Signal data of ion
chamber-1 available in window I is chosen for this purpose.
From the Fourier transform of this data shown in Fig. 7, it
is evident that the magnitude of the transform approaches
the noise floor level approximately after pi/64 rad/sample.
Thus, the maximum scale for decomposition is selected such
that pi/2J ≥pi/64, i.e., J = 6. Accordingly, the wavelet
transformation matrix W for J = 6 is used in the analysis.
Significant scales can be found out by analysing the wavelet
coefficients. From Fig. 8 that shows the wavelet coefficients
of signals from ion chamber-1 in Window I, it can be clearly
observed that scales 1 and 2 do not carry much information as
compared to scales 3 to 6. A quantitative analysis examining
the energy of wavelet coefficients can give further information
about information present in different scales. The fraction of
energy of detail coefficients from all ion chambers at different
scales can be seen in Fig. 9. Both of these preliminary analyses
suggest that scales 3 to 6 contain most of the energy for all ion
chamber signals as compared to that of scales 1 and 2. Thus,
detail coefficients at scales 1 and 2 can be ignored during
reconstruction. Therefore, signal reconstruction is performed
by considering detail coefficients from scales 3 to 6 and
approximation at scale 6. The removal of inconsequential
detail coefficients is justified, as there is no meaningful loss
of useful information in the denoised signal.
Singular value decomposition is performed on different
data, such as approximations, details, and reconstructed data,
as a first step of PCA. The orders of the PCA models,
mj , j = 0, 1, ..., J + 1, where j = 0 represents the index of
the reconstructed data, while the rest have their usual meaning,
are to be chosen based on the CPV curves of their respective
data. The CPVs of approximations and reconstructed data are
greater than 95% with only one principal component (p = 1)
such that the order of the residual subspace m = 9 − p = 8.
However, for detail coefficients, substantial amount of CPVs
are obtained with p = 8, which make the model order
m = 9− p = 1. The matrices P j and Bj , j = 0, 1, ..., J + 1,
of all the data are formed based on these model orders. The
approximation and detail coefficients of ion chamber-5 for
J = 6 are shown in Fig. 10. Ion chamber-5 is chosen to
present some characteristics of MSPCA-based FDI as the sig-
nal corresponding to this sensor is additionally contaminated
by a sensor fault from instant 3000. Since the window I is
meant especially for model development, the analysis from the
window II onward is presented in the following subsections.
B. No fault signatures in the data
Approximation and detail coefficients for window II are
shown in Fig. 10. The approximation coefficients carry the
trend of the data while detail coefficients contain mainly the
contribution from noise. This behaviour of MSPCA-based FDI
is expected as the ion chamber data carries noisy steady state
measurement without any fault signatures or process change
in this window.
C. Faults with localized time-frequency contents
In the presence of time-frequency localized contents in the
data due to some process faults in the reactor, the scales
that are sensitive to these contents show variations in their
wavelet coefficients. This section demonstrates the outcomes
of MSPCA-based FDI in the presence of two frequency modes
in the ion chamber data with f1 = 5 Hz and f2 = 11 Hz
that correspond to fuel assembly vibrations (refer to Sec. IV)
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Fig. 4. Data windows for the simulation of different scenarios.
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Fig. 5. The growth of the sensor-fault magnitude (mA) in ion chamber-5.
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Fig. 6. Signals of all 9 ion chambers.
[23]. These frequency modes are added into the data as per
equations (20) and (21) and the data windows presented in
Fig. 4.
Fig. 10 shows the approximations and detail coefficients
of the data of 5th ion chamber for J = 6. From Fig.
10, it can be observed that under the steady-state condition
in window II, the approximation coefficients represent slow
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Fig. 7. Fourier transform of signal from first ion chamber.
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Fig. 8. Fuel assembly vibrations: wavelet coefficients of signal from ion
chamber-1 in window I (a) approximations at level-6, (b) details at level-6,
(c) details at level-5, (d) details at level-4, (e) details at level-3, (f) details at
level-2, and (g) details at level-1.
variation in the process and have non-zero mean whereas the
detail coefficients have zero-mean with no auto-correlation.
However, the approximations and the detail coefficients have
auto-correlated nature with non-zero values when there are
process faults accompanied with frequencies either f1, or f2,
or both (windows III to V). The presence of the frequencies
f1 = 5 and f2 = 11 can be easily identified respectively
in windows III and IV from the approximation and details
at level 4 to 6, while the overlapping of f1 on f2 can be
identified in window V. It can also be observed in Fig. 10
that not all the details coefficients show dynamic variations
representative of process faults. To be specific, the sensitivities
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Fig. 9. Fraction of energy of detail coefficients of all ion chamber signals in
window I at different scales.
of details at levels 1 and 2 are negligible to the faults with
f1 = 5 Hz and f2 = 11 Hz, and these details mainly represent
the white Gaussian random process. On the other hand, the
wavelet coefficients of other ion chambers may exhibit a
similar behaviour due to the fact that all ion chambers signals
are similarly affected during a process fault.
The ion chamber-5 undergoes a sensor fault from window
VI onwards and it can be clearly observed from Fig. 10 by
the sudden variation of approximation and details at level 4 to
6 at the onset of window VI. The details at level 1 to 3 can
be seen to be insensitive to the sensor fault and they continue
to represent the high-frequency components due to process
faults. The presence of frequencies in addition to sensor fault
in windows VI to VIII, can be detected from the approximation
and details coefficients. However, in window IX, no frequency
components can be observed from any of these coefficients.
At the commencement of window X, which carries the data
of the process change, the approximations drift as they capture
the trend of the data, while the details are insensitive to this
slowly varying phenomenon. The detection of frequencies in
the presence of sensor faults and process change, in windows
XI to XIII, can be seen from wavelet coefficients.
Fig. 11 shows the SPE statistics of the wavelet coefficients
of all the 9 ion chambers. From Fig. 11(a), it can be observed
that the SPE of approximation is insensitive to frequency
changes as it is close to zero for the data in windows III
to V. The SPEs of details at levels 3 to 6 are fairly above
the threshold exactly at the occurrence of frequency modes
representative of the faults giving a very good simultaneous
time and frequency localization. However, the SPEs obtained
for details at levels 1 and 2 do not carry much information. In
Fig. 11, the sensitivities of SPEs at levels 3 to 6 are attributed
to the changes in the covariance structures of details-data at
levels 3 to 6 shown in Fig. 10 from those obtained in the
model development. The violation of SPEs above the threshold
suggests that there exists a process fault. The detection rate,
which is the ratio of the number of fault detection instants
and the number of instants at which the fault really exists, is
computed at all levels of decomposition in each window for
establishing the efficacy of the FDI scheme. Table I gives the
detection rates from which the sensitivities of details at scales
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Fig. 10. Fuel assembly vibrations: wavelet coefficients of signal from 5th
ion chamber (a) approximations at level-6, (b) details at level-6, (c) details at
level-5, (d) details at level-4, (e) details at level-3, (f) details at level-2, and
(g) details at level-1.
3 to 6 in response to process faults can be observed.
D. Sensor fault
As discussed earlier, there is a sensor fault in the ion
chamber-5 from the inception of window VI leading to a
change in approximations and details from k = 3000. SPEs
of approximations and details also experience a change at
this instant at which the covariance structure of the data
is broken. However, SPEs of some finer level details are
ignorant of the breakage of covariance structure due to a
fault in ion chamber-5. SPEs of the original measurement data
before getting fed to the online MSPCA scheme (refer to Fig.
3), the reconstructed data obtained with the inverse wavelet
transformation and the level-6 approximations of all 9 ion
chambers are respectively shown in Fig. 12(a), 12(b), and Fig.
11(a) along with the thresholds for fault detection. It can be
seen from these characteristics that SPEs violate the threshold
after k = 3000 at which the sensor fault arises, such that the
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TABLE I
DETECTION RATES FOR PROCESS FAULTS IN VARIOUS WINDOWS FOR FUEL ASSEMBLY VIBRATIONS.
Scale Index Window No.II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Approximations at level-6 0 0 0 0 25.20 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Details at level-6 10 81.40 67.80 89 85.40 66.80 82.40 28 7 82.80 67.20 82.60
Details at level-5 4.60 79.80 91.40 89.40 83.60 89.20 90.60 15.40 7.60 78 90 91.20
Details at level-4 2.20 5.80 14.60 15.40 4.40 7.80 17.40 11.20 1.20 5.80 12.20 17.80
Details at level-3 1.20 4.80 5 9.20 3 5.40 9.60 5.80 1 3.20 5.60 9.20
Details at level-2 1 1.20 1 0.40 1.40 1.20 1 1.20 0.80 1 1.20 1
Details at level-1 1.80 0.40 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.80 0.60 1 1.40 1 1.20
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Fig. 11. Fuel assembly vibrations: SPE of (a) approximation coefficients
at level-6, (b) detail coefficients at level-6, (c) detail coefficients at level-5,
(d) detail coefficients at level-4, (e) detail coefficients at level-3, (f) detail
coefficients at level-2, and (g) detail coefficients at level-1. (The horizontal
red line represents the threshold for the SPE.)
fault identification (finding of faulty ion chamber) procedure
using GLRT is automatically triggered.
Constraint model (A) determines the relationship among
ion chamber signals and play a crucial role in GLRT. They
are obtained through the application of PCA on the above-
mentioned three variants with an objective of building fault
signature vectors. Recall from Section V-A that the CPV
calculation led to a model order m = 8 for these low frequency
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Fig. 12. Sensor Fault Detection: SPEs from (a) the original measurement
data, (b) the reconstructed measurement data.
data. Models corresponding to original, reconstructed, and
level-6 approximations data are respectively given by AO,
AR and AA in Appendix-B. It is worth noting that the
relationships among ion chamber signals explained by these
models obtained from one operating condition of the reactor
hold good for other operating conditions including transients
also when a successful spatial control scheme is employed [3].
In the simulations, the maximum possible number of simul-
taneous sensor-faults g is chosen as 1, not only to simplify the
demonstration but also due to the fact that more than one ion
chamber being simultaneously faulty is unlikely in practice.
The fault signature vectors are obtained from the columns of
the models (refer to Appendix-B) such that all single-sensor-
fault scenarios are exhaustively considered as per (10).
GLRT outcomes, namely faulty-sensor index and corre-
sponding fault magnitude (mA), obtained for original, recon-
structed, and approximations data are shown respectively in
Fig. 13, 14, and 15. On comparing these GLRT outcomes
with the corresponding SPEs shown in Fig. 12 and 11(a),
it can be observed that there is a set of GLRT outcomes
for every SPE violating the threshold. It can be seen that
the GLRT analysis based on reconstructed data is better than
that based on original data. However, the GLRT applied
on approximations data is more prompt in the detection of
sensor-faults and more accurate in finding the faulty ion
chamber and estimating the corresponding fault magnitude
as compared to other two variants. It can also be observed
that the fault magnitudes estimated with the GLRT applied on
reconstructed data (Fig. 14(b)) and on approximations (Fig.
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Fig. 13. Sensor-FDI with original measurement data: (a) Faulty sensor index,
(b) Estimate of the fault magnitude.
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Fig. 14. Sensor-FDI with reconstructed measurement data: (a) Faulty sensor
index, (b) Estimate of the fault magnitude.
15(b)) are very much in line with the actual value of fault
added in the ion chamber-5 signal. The effectiveness of the
FDI with GLRT is expressed in Table II in terms of the indices
ODR, OP, and MSE as discussed in Section II-C. It can be
seen from Table II that ODR, OP, and MSE obtained from
reconstructed data and approximations are better than those
obtained with the original data. In particular, the performance
based on approximations is very far superior to the other two
approaches. From these observations, it can be concluded that
the proposed formulation using GLRT is an improved and
superior version than the other alternatives. It can also be seen
that the proposed scheme yielded consistent results for sensor-
FDI even during process faults and during a process change.
Summarizing the results obtained in the different simula-
tions, it is possible to state that the MSPCA-based FDI has
the ability to handle process faults along with the sensor-FDI
and can serve as an important tool for predictive maintenance
of reactor internals.
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Fig. 15. Sensor-FDI with 6-level approximations data: (a) Faulty sensor index,
(b) Estimate of the fault magnitude.
VI. CONCLUSION
A multi-scale principal component analysis approach for
online fault detection and identification in the Advanced Heavy
Water Reactor using ex-core ion chambers has been presented.
The technique combines proficiency of wavelets in multi-scale
data representation and time-frequency localization with fault
detection capability of Principal Component Analysis making
it well suitable for time-frequency localized faults. Specifi-
cally, parsimonious PCA models are developed on significant
scales. The squared prediction error statistics are computed
at significant scales to detect time-frequency localized events
representative of vibration of reactor internals or process faults.
Along with the process faults, generalized likelihood ratio
test is also applied on original, reconstructed, and approxi-
mations with the help of a suitable mathematical formulation
to identify the faulty sensor, if any, and the corresponding
fault magnitude. Different scenarios have been considered to
include various challenges for fault detection and isolation
in the reactor operation. Simulation results establish that the
proposed scheme is very effective in detecting process faults
and sensor faults during both the transient-state as well as the
steady-state operation. The results also suggest that it can be a
very good tool for predictive maintenance of reactor internals
against vibration-induced accidents.
APPENDIX A
PROOF TO LEMMA III.1
The uni-variate time-series data y¯ ∈ R2J×1 in (17) can be
expressed as
y¯ = x¯+ ε¯+ b¯, (A.1)
where x¯, ε¯, and b¯ respectively are the true values of the vari-
able being measured, measurement errors and the magnitude
of sensor-fault, if any, in the window of 2J samples.
From (17) and (18), we have the wavelet approximation co-
efficients yJ+1 as the linear combination of 2
J measurements
with the elements in H˜J . Letting y¯J+1 be the ordered set of
approximation coefficients of all n variables, the covariance
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TABLE II
ODR (%), OP (%) AND MSE FOR SENSOR FAULTS IN VARIOUS WINDOWS WITH DIFFERENT DATA VARIANTS
Data type Index Window No.II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Original data
ODR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.60 5.20 24.80 57.80 86.00 95.80
OP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.60 5.20 24.60 57.80 86 95.80
MSE - - - - - - 0.85 0.52 0.41 0.31 0.26 0.2879
Reconstructed data
ODR 0 0 0 0 0 3.20 45 85.60 99.80 100 100 100
OP 0 0 0 0 0 3.20 44.80 85.60 99.80 100 100 100
MSE - - - - - 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15
Approximations data
ODR 0 0 0 0 25.20 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
OP 0 0 0 0 25.20 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
MSE - - - - 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
matrix of measurement error in y¯J+1 can be related to that in
y¯, i.e., Σε as
Σε,J+1 = H˜J e¯e¯
T H˜
T
JΣε, (A.2)
where e¯ ∈ R2J×1 is a column vector with all elements equal
to 1. The covariance matrix of constraint residuals obtained
from y¯J+1 is [24]
Σr,J+1 = AAΣ
T
ε,J+1A
T
A, (A.3)
where AA is the PCA-based constraint model obtained from
approximation coefficients.
For a hypothesized sensor fault corresponding to ith variable,
the expected value of constraint residuals based on approxi-
mation coefficients is
E[r] = E[AAy¯J+1]
= AAEiH˜
T
J b¯, (A.4)
where Ei ∈ Rn×2J is a matrix whose ith row has its all
elements equal to 1. Hence, from (A.4), the fault signature
matrix in various hypothesized-number of sensor faults up to
g is [24]
F i =

AAEi1H˜
T
J , i1 = 1, ..., n;
AA(Ei1H˜
T
J ,Ei2H˜
T
J ), ∀i1, i2 = 1, ..., n, i1 6= i2; ...;
AA(Ei1H˜
T
J ,Ei2H˜
T
J , ...,EigH˜
T
J ),
∀i1, i2, ..., ig = 1, ..., n, i1 6= i2 6= ... 6= ig.
The formulation of GLRT subsequent to this will be on
similar lines as that explained in Sec. II-C.
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APPENDIX B
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